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JERRY R. PROBST, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
) 
: 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ) 
OF UTAH, J. BRENT WOOD : 
d/b/a KITCO, INC. AND STATE ) 
FARM FIRE & CASUALTY, : 
) 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for review of an order of the Industrial 
Corrunission of Utah modifying an order previously entered by the 
Hearing Examiner. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The hearing examiner in the Industrial Commission of Utah, 
on April 5, 1977, awarded plaintiff $17,708.00 in disability 
benefits as compensation for his injury, which award was based 
on the maximum State average weekly wage. Defendants filed 
a motion to review pursuant to Section 35-1-82.53 U.C.A. (1953, 
as amended) and the matter was referred by the Hearing Examiner 
to the CoIIlIIlission. The Commission, on the 24th day of June, 1977 
modified the Hearing Examiner's order by reducing the award to 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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$12, 108. 58, plus medical expenses but allowing a credi' t • 
•Ot 
amounts already paid. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Appellant seeks to have the Industrial c 
ormnission 
order reversed on the grounds that the Commission acted arbitrar: 
capriciously in reducing the Hearing Examiner's award and k 
• see 1 
to have the Hearing Examiner's original order reinstated. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 24, 1976, appellant, Probst was injured when 
his left hand was crushed by a hydraulic machine. Plaintiff's 
hand was subsequently amputated. (R. 41) At the time of his 
injury appellant was nearly 22 years of age ( R. 26) and was 
working for defendant Kitco, Inc. 
Appellant applied for Workmens Compensation and on Januarv 
31, 1977 a hearing was held in the Industrial Commission of Utai 
The issue at that hearing was the calculation of plaintiff's 
average weekly wage to provide a basis for an award of disabilir 
payments, and the second issue was whether appellant was entitk 
to a 15 percent increase in his award, representing a penalty 
against the employer for maintaining an unsafe working envirOTIE' 
The evidence showed that appellant was earning $2.50 per 
hour (R. 56, 86) at the time of the injury and had it not been 
1 30 hour s that ~1: for the injury would have worked approximate Y 
( R. 28, 31, 32, 35, 54, and 55). Appellant introducedevideni 
. h · ;ages co' showing that with further training and experience is \ 
-2-
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reasonably be expected to be raised to $3.00 to $3.25 per hour 
by Kitco. (R. 86, 87) There was no evidence offered by appellant, 
however, to show how much he might have earned at the same type 
of employment but for some other employer. In other words there 
was no evidence offered by plaintiff to show what the prevailing 
wages were in the industry. 
The Hearing Examiner allowed the parties to file memorandums 
of law subsequent to the hearing. Before either memorandum was 
filed, however, the Hearing Examiner prepared a preliminary draft 
of its findings and conclusions ( R. 128) indicating his intent 
to award the appellant $9,699.06 in disability payments, based 
on the amount appellant was earning at the time of the injury. 
Appellant thereafter filed his memorandum (R. 130) arguing that 
the Commission had the discretion to award a larger amount so 
as to more "fairly compensate the claimant for his injuries." 
Thereafter, but before respondent's memorandum was filed and with-
out the benefit of respondent's memo the Hearing Examiner entered 
his order (R. 141-147) awarding appellant disability benefits in 
the amount of $17,708.00, based not on what the appellant was earning 
at the time of the injury but on the maximum State average weekly 
wage at the time of the injury. 
Respondent-Defendants thereafter filed a motion for review 
accompanied by their memorandum of law (R.148-161) and the matter 
was referred to the Commission. The Commission, on June 24, 1977 
entered an order reducing the Hearing Examiner's award to $12,108.58 
-3-
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less amounts already paid, based on an average weekly wage 
reflecting not what the appellant was earning at the time of 
the injury nor the maximum State average weekly wage but an 
amount in between representing what the claimant might reason, 
a~. 
expected to have earned in the future through wage increases 
at the same employment. (R. 176-180). 
Plaintiff-appellant relying on Section 35-1-76 U.C.A. (!~); 
as amended), argues that the Commission acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously in basing its award for disability payments on thE 
amount that plaintiff might reasonably expect to earn in the 
future through wage increases in the same employment, and maint:. 
that since the appellant has recently earned as high as $6.00 
per hour in other unrelated employment, the Connnission should 
have based its award on the maximum State average weekly wage. 
The Commission found that appellant was temporarily total! 
disabled for 18 weeks and 2 days, and should have been compensate 
for the loss of his hand for 168 weeks for permanent partial 




THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DID NOT ACT ARBITRARILY OR 
CAPRICIOUSLY WHEN IT BASED ITS AWARD TO APPELLANT ON 
COMPENSATION APPELLA~ff MAY HAVE EAR..f\lED IN THE FUTURE BUT 
WITHIN THE SAME E11PLOYHENT. 
Appellant Is argument is based on Section 35-1-76 u.c.A. 
(1953 as amended). That Section provides: 
-4-
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"If it is established that the injured employee 
was of such age and experience when injured that 
und7r natural conditions his wages would be expected 
to increase, that fact may be considered in arriving 
at his average weekly wage." 
Appellant argues that this statute gives the Commission a 
freehand to calculate an injured person's average weekly wage 
based on what he might expect to earn in the future in some other 
entirely unrelated but more lucrative employment. The Commission 
disagreed, ruling that while this statute was applicable it never-
theless has certain restrictions, and that while the Commission 
may consider future wage increases they must consider only those 
wage increases that are reasonably to be expected within the same 
employment as the claimant is engaged in at the time of the injury. 
While it is to be expected that appellant would seek a 
greater award, it cannot be said that the Commissionacted arbi-
trarily and capriciously in awarding the lesser amount limited 
to expected wage increases within the same employment. The 
evidence introduced by appellant himself was that he was earning 
$2.SO an hour at the time of the injury but could have expected 
to earn as much as $3.25 an hour with further training and experience 
in the same employment. The Commission in making its award used 
the higher figure of $3.25 an hour to calculate plaintiff's average 
weekly wage. There is clearly substantial evidence therefore to 
support the Commission's award and appellant has not shown 
in what respect the Commission was arbitrary or capricious. 
Naturally we must sympathize with appellant and we do not 
intend in any way to minimize the severity of his injury. This 
-5-
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• 
Court, as well as many others, however have ruled th t 
' a where 
statutes such as Section 35-1-76 are applicable the 
' • Y must be 
applied with certain restrictions, and that they a 
re not intena: 
to vest the Commission with the broad discretion t d' o isregard t: 
formulas for calculating average weekly wage. 
The court should note at this point that a strong argument 
can be made, and was made in the Industrial Commission by defe} 
dants, that Section 35-1- 76 is not at all applicable under the 
facts of this case, and that accordingly the Commission's aware 
should have been based on plaintiff's wages at the time of the 
injury or $2. 50 an hour. The case of Brewer vs. Industrial 
Commission, et al 89 Utah 596, 58 P. 2d 33 (1936) intrepreted tL 
identical statute. In that case an employee was killed in an 
accident arising out of his employment as a coal miner. The 
State insurance fund assumed liability and paid benefits to thE 
widow and the six minor children based upon the employee's wagE 
of $3. 00 per day at the time of the injury which resulted in hi: 
death. The widow argued that she was entitled to an increased 
award based on the belief that her husband may reasonably have 
been expected to earn $5. 00 to $8. 00 per day in the near future. 
The Court rejected this argument stating that this particular 
statute has a more restricted application. In support of its 
f h of Industr~ position the court quoted with approval rom t e case ~
JJ' Cormnission of Ohio vs. Royer, 122 Ohio St 271, 171 N.E. 337, c 
wherein that Court in interpreting an identical statute stated: 
-6-
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"Manifestly it was not intended that the 
Commissio~ sh~uld have a freehand in awarding 
compensation in an excess of two-thirds of the 
average wage at the time of the injury, neither 
was it intended that a jury should be given 
the same latitude. The award of compensation is 
not a matter of discretion, and neither the 
Commission nor Courts and Juries may disregard 
the measure of compensation which the statute 
provides, nor may they be moved by either 
sympathy or prejudice." 
The Utah Supreme Court stated: 
"This section must be read in connection with the 
previous one which definitely makes the basis 
of compensation the average weekly wage of the 
employee at the time of injury. The section 
was intended to have a restricted application. 
The provision is peculiarly adapted to apply 
in case of minors or persons of immature years 
whose wages are usually less than that of adults 
in like employment, but who would be expected 
naturally and normally to reach the wage scale 
of adults with increasing years and experience." 
Id. at 36. 
The facts and circumstances of the instant case are not, 
according to Utah Supreme Court appropriate to enlist the aid 
of Section 35-1-76. Mr. Probst was not a minor or person of 
immature years at the time of the injury, but was one month 
short of reaching his 22nd birthday at the time of the injury, 
was married shortly after the injury and, furthermore, there 
is no evidence whatsoever that by reason of his age he was 
earning less than older adults employed at the same work. 
The Commission, however, did find that this statute was 
applicable in this case but that it must be applied in a reasonably 
restrictive manner and does not open the doors to the Commission 
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to calculate a claimant's average weekly wage i·n h t w a ever manner 
they choose. On this particular point the Brewer case, Citing 
the Royer case is also instructive. The Court stated: 
"~nfortunat7l:(, t~e legislature h<:s not clearly 
fixed the limitations of the consideration to 
be given to age and experience; yet there must 
necessarily be certain limitations, because every inj· 
employee has both age and experience to his credit u ..
and greater age and experience in prospect. If ' 
it was meant to confer an unlimited discretion 
there was no occasion to employ the consideration 
of age and experien("'"'. To permit the Commission 
or a Jury to so interpret the expression relating 
to age and experience and to permit liberal awards 
that discretion would bring the whole subject of 
awards into a state of uncertainty." 
This Court was comfortable in citing the Ohio case Royer 1 
i 
supra, since, as this court pointed out, its law is practically I 
identical to ours, and that large portions of our workrnens com· 
pensation laws were taken from the Ohio law, The Utah Supreme 
Court, again quoting Royer, stated: 
"In the absence of leeislative interpretation we are 
of the opinion that age and experience should only 
be considered in the case of persons of immature 
years who have not yet become skillfull in the 
particular employment in which they were engaged at 
the time of the injury. Those terms should not be 
held to apply to all ambitious persons on the, sole 
ground that they aspire to promotion in mor~ im-
portant, more skillfull, and more remunerative 
employment." Id at 35. 
The Court in Brewer, also quoted with approval from the 
case of Raymond Gagnon's C3.se, 228 Mass. 334, 117 N.E. 321, when 
an injured employee was an 18 year old boy but where the court ir. 
, o'I 
interpreting an almost identical statute limited determination· 
the weekly wage to the probable natural increase of wages of~: 
-8-
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injured party in the same employment in which he was engaged 
when injured. That court stated: 
"This interpretation is confirmed by practical 
considerations. 
The scheme of the act is that the employer shall 
be insured against the losses from personal injury 
to employees arising out of and in the course of 
their employment. The cost of such insurance can 
be determined so long as the basis on which com-
pensation is to be reckoned is wages paid by 
the employer. It can readily be determined so 
long as the standard fixed by the definition of 
average weekly wages ... is followed. But it 
would be a matter of utter uncertainty if the 
compensation to be paid should depend, not upon 
wages paid, but upon wages which the Industrial 
Accident Board after an injury may find upon 
independant evidence, perhaps not readily opened 
to the employer during the period of employment, 
that the injured employee might have earned in 
some other employment or field of activity." 
In the case of Gruber vs. Kramer Amusement Corp. et al 207 
App. Div. 564, 202 N.Y.S. 413 (1924), the injured employee was 
a 17 year old boy who was employed as a helper and received 
$4.00 per day at an amusement park. While engaged in his regular 
work his foot was crushed by one of the cars. The employee con-
tended that his average weekly wage should be based on what he 
might be expected to earn in other employment, as a machinist or 
a plumber's helper. The court ruled that his compensation must 
be based on his employment at the time of the injury and stated: 
"In the case of a minor as of other employees, we 
must seek his average weekly wages in the employ-
ment in which he was injure~ not in some other 
employment. We may not speculate upon what other 
more lucrative employment a minor might enter." 
-9-
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In discussing this very issue in 99 C. J. S. Workmens Com-
pensation, Section 65 (f) it states, in interpreting statues 
similar to Section 35-1-76: 
"However the possible increase must be in the 
wages in the employment in which he was injured 
and not some other more lucrative employment which 
he might enter. . . " 
In all of the cases cited, the courts recognize that if 
the average weekly wage was to be increased at all to there~ 
increase the award, the increase must be limited to the same 
employment if it was probable and natural that the employee 
could expect an increase of wages. 
Plaintiff-appellant relies heavily on two New York cases, 
Donnelly vs. Buffalo Evening News, Inc., 174 N.Y.S.2d 361 (19\c' 
and Haldane vs. Buffalo Evening News 174 N.Y.S.2d 365 (1958).Tr.i 
court should note that under either of those cases the plaintiff· 
appellant in the instant case would have no argument at all sinci 
the New York statute applies only to minors, whereas in this cas1 
the plaintiff-appellant is a 22 year old adult. Moreoever both 
of those cases emphasize the peculiar and special circumstances: 
a young news boy delivering newspapers for an employer. The cour 
in Donnelly recognized the rule that a finding of wage expectanc: 
must be limited to the same or similar employment, as well it mw 
in view of its earlier holding in Gruber supra, but stated that 
this rule should not apply " to the peculiar and unusual st• 
-10-
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u;· 
I 
of a newsboy." The plaintiff-appellant also cites two Oklahoma 
cases, Harmon's Texaco Station vs. Kessinger, 365 P.2d 131 (Okla. 
l961) and Williamsen vs. Grimm 425 P. 2d 992 (Okla. 1967). Again 
the statutes being construed in those cases applied strictly 
to minors, and under those statutes the plaintiff-appellant in 
this case would have had no basis whatsoever for his argument. 
Not one of the other many cases cited by plaintiff-appellant 
have anything whatsoever to do with the issues involved in this 
action. Those cases dealt with the continuing jurisdiction of 
the conunission, interpretations of Section 35-1-69 U.C.A., defi-
nition of employees, admissibility of heresay evidence and 
other matters, but none of them interpreted the statute here in 
question, and are not helpful in the instant case. 
Significantly, the very action that the plaintiff-appellant 
now complains of is the action that the plaintiff-appellant urged 
the Corrrrnission to take in the initial proceedings in the Industrial 
ColIIlllission. In his memorandum of law, filed with the Industrial 
ColIIlllission after the hearing on the merits, plaintiff-appellant 
argued that by virtue of Section 35-1-76 he was entitled to have 
his average weekly wage increased based on an expected wage of 
$3.25 per hour, in light of his age and experience. (R.130-135). 
Plaintiff-appellant did not at that time claim that Section 35-1-76 
authorized the Commission to increase the average weekly wage to 
the maximum amount permitted by law as he now urges this court to 
do, Rather plaintiff-appellant argued that this particular section 
... -ll-
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authorized the Commission to use the $3. 25 per hour figure as 
a basis for calculating his average weekly wage. The Industrial 
Commission has now done that and rather than accept their de . , 
cisio: 
plaintiff-appellant has appealed to this court to find that the 
Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously. The Industrial 
Commission did not act arbitrarily and capriciously but simply 
followed the guideline set down in the cases and other authorith 
in Utah and elsewhere which have addressed this issue, and accora~ 
ly their action should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAS NOT BEEN DENIED THE OPPORTUNITY 
TO PRESENT EVIDENCE AS TO WAGES IN THE SAME EMPLOYMENT 
IN WHICH HE WAS ENGAGED. 
Plaintiff-appellant was represented by counsel at the 
hearing in this matter and had full opportunity to present 
witnesses and evidence on all of the issues involved in this 
case. Plaintiff-appellant's counsel had the opportunity 
to, and did, cross-examine the witnesses produced by the defen· 
dants (R. 77). At that time plaintiff-appellant's counsel 
introduced evidence tending to show the amount of wages that 
were generally paid by defendant in the same employment that 
plaintiff-appellant was engaged, and what wages plaintiff-appel· 
lant might reasonably be expected to earn should he receive furt': 
training and experience in the same employment. There was never! 
any evidence offered by plaintiff-appellant to show that wages 
h . f 1 t nor indeed were industry-wide in t is same type o emp oymen , 
-12-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
was there any evidence that such measure of wages could be 
made. There was no evidence to show that the kind of work 
performed by plaintiff-appellant was performed in other companies, 
50 that an accurate measure could be made. Plaintiff-appellant 
had every opportunity to present evidence on this issue but 
failed to do so and cannot now be heard to complain. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above defendant-respondents respect-
fully request that the Industrial Commission's actions be 
affirmed. 
Dated this 18th day of May, 1978. 
Respectfully submitted, i 
;J ~- le__/( .,__ ~KG. NOEL ~
Attorney for Defendant-
Respondent 
604 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Delivered a copy of the foregoing Brief to Bryce D. McEuen, 
Attorney at Law, 56 North State Street, Orem, Utah 84601, this 
18th day of May, 1978. 
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